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Abstract 
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supply and of the recent extraordinary surge in the U.S. oil production for analysing impact on 
U.S. stock prices. A positive U.S. oil supply shock has a positive impact on U.S. real stock 
returns. Oil demand and supply shocks are of comparable importance in explaining U.S. real 
stock returns when supply shocks from U.S. and non-U.S. oil production are identified. 
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The Impact of Oil Price Shocks on the U.S. Stock Market:  
A Note on the Roles of U.S. and non-U.S. Oil Production 
1. Introduction 
Kilian and Park (2009) present a novel method for examining the relationship 
between U.S. stock market behaviour and oil price shocks. Building on the seminal 
contribution in Kilian (2009), which demonstrates that demand and supply shocks in the 
market for oil have different effects on the United States (U.S.) economy and the real oil 
price, they show that the reaction of U.S. real stock returns to an oil price shock depends on 
the source of the underlying cause of the oil price change. One of the major conclusions in 
Kilian and Park (2009) is that global oil supply shocks are much less important than global 
aggregate and oil-specific demand shocks in understanding aggregate U.S. stock market 
behaviour. Our study is concerned with the question: Do U.S. oil supply shocks affect U.S. 
real stock market returns? 
After several decades of steady decline in the U.S. oil production, innovations and 
new technologies in the extraction of crude oil have resulted in an unprecedented expansion 
in U.S. oil production in recent years. This development is significant because an increase in 
U.S. crude oil production directly boosts U.S. domestic income compared with an increase in 
non-U.S. crude oil production. In addition, enhanced U.S. oil production has consequences 
for political and economic security and hence U.S. asset markets that are likely to be different 
from increases in non-U.S. oil production. The recovery of U.S. oil production in recent years 
is illustrated in Figure 1. We investigate the effect of disaggregating the world oil production 
variable in Kilian and Park’s (2009) Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) into U.S. oil 
production and non-U.S. oil production. Hendry and Hubrich (2011) argue that including 
disaggregated information improves forecast accuracy in VAR models. 
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In this study we revisit Kilian and Park’s (2009) analysis to examine the effect of 
world oil supply shocks on the U.S. real stock market returns. We find that both the 
disaggregation of world oil supply and the unprecedented surge in the U.S. oil production 
since 2009 are important factors in determining U.S. real stock returns. A positive U.S. oil 
supply shock has a positive impact on U.S. real stock returns that is statistically significant in 
the fourteenth month and later. This result is sensitive to the inclusion of recent data that 
captures shale oil production. In a sample ending before the start of shale oil production, a 
positive U.S. oil supply shock has a positive statistically significant impact on U.S. real stock 
returns only in the twenty-first and twenty-second months.  
Variance decomposition analysis shows that by disaggregating world oil production 
into U.S. and non-U.S. oil production supply shocks are comparable to demand shocks (in 
contrast to the Kilian and Park (2009) result) in explaining U.S. real stock returns.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
 We utilize monthly stock and oil market data and examine the two periods: January 
1973 to December 2006, and January 1973 to December 2014. The first period is examined 
in Kilian and Park (2009) and the second is an update that incorporates the oil production 
expansion in the U.S. in more recent years. The aggregate U.S. real stock market return ( tret ) 
is obtained by subtracting the CPI inflation rate from the log returns on the value-weighted 
market portfolio obtained from the Centre for Research in Security Price (CRSP). The oil 
supply proxy variables are given by the per cent changes in non-U.S. oil production 
( )nonUStprod  and in U.S. oil production ( )UStprod  from the U.S. Department of Energy. 
The global real economic activity proxy is the index of real economic activity ( trea ) 
constructed by Kilian (2009). The real price of oil ( trpo ) is U.S. refiner acquisition cost of 
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imported crude oil, from the U.S. Department of Energy since 1974:01 deflated by the U.S. 
CPI, with the series extended back to 1973:01 following Barsky and Kilian (2002). 
A structural VAR model of order p  is utilized to extract the separate supply and 
demand-side sources underlying oil price changes and their relation to the U.S. stock market 
return: 
 0 0
1
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t i t i t
i
A y c A y 

    (1) 
where ( , , , , )nonUS USt t t t t ty prod prod rea rpo ret    is a 5 1  vector of endogenous variables, 0A  
denotes the 5 5  contemporaneous coefficient matrix, 0c  represents a 5 1  vector of 
constant terms, iA  refers to the 5 5  autoregressive coefficient matrices, and t  stands for a 
5 1  vector of structural disturbances. 
The identifying restrictions on 10A , as a lower-triangle coefficient matrix in the 
structual VAR model, follows the setup in Kilian (2009). Kilian (2009) argues that oil 
production does not respond to contemporaneous changes in oil demand within a given 
month because of the high adjustment cost of changing oil production. Fluctuation in the real 
price of oil will not affect global economic activity within a given month due to the 
sluggishness of aggregate economic reaction. The real stock return ordered after oil shocks is 
motivated by Lee and Ni (2002) and Kilian and Vega (2011), who argue that oil prices are 
predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates within a given month. We 
assume that non-U.S. oil production does not respond to U.S. oil supply shock within a given 
month. The U.S. is an oil importing country whose oil production averages 11.5% of the 
global oil production over January 1973 to December 2014.   
 
3. Empirical results 
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 In Figure 2 we report the cumulative impulse response of U.S. real stock returns to 
negative one standard deviation structural shocks in non-U.S., U.S., and world oil production 
over 1973:01-2006:12 and over 1973:01-2014:12. Results for shocks in non-U.S. and U.S. oil 
production are obtained from estimation of the five variable model in equation (1) and results 
for shocks in world oil production are obtained from estimating the four variable model in 
Kilian and Park (2009).  
The results in Figure 2a based on data over 1973:01-2006:12 are in line with the 
Kilian and Park (2009) paper in that non-U.S. and U.S. oil production shocks are mostly not 
statistically significant in determining U.S. real stock returns. The result for a negative non-
U.S. oil production shock on real stock returns is similar to the result for a negative world oil 
production shock on real stock returns reported by Kilian and Park (2009), and replicated 
here in the first diagram in Figure 2c.  
Figure 2b using data over 1973:01-2014:12 shows a negative U.S. oil supply shock is 
associated with a negative response in U.S. real stock returns that is statistically significant 
over most of the horizon. The response of U.S. real stock returns to a negative shock to non-
U.S. oil supply is markedly different from that to a negative shock to U.S. oil supply. In 
Figure 2b  a negative innovation in non-U.S. oil supply is associated with a rise in U.S. real 
stock returns that is statistically significant or close to being statistically significant in the 
fourth through twelfth months. This result is hard to reconcile with the intuition that non-U.S. 
oil supply disruptions are associated with a fall in the U.S. stock market.  
The result for a negative world oil supply shock on real stock returns in the Kilian and 
Park (2009) model over 1973:01-2014:12 are reported in the second diagram in Figure 2c. 
The impulse responses in the fourth through twelfth months range are positive and partially 
statistically significant, indicating a problematic result for the effect on U.S. real stock returns 
of both world oil supply and non-U.S. oil supply shocks for the 1973:02-2014:12 sample.   
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The difference in the results for the original sample in Kilian and Park (2009) and the 
full sample, suggests that the model for the full sample is influenced by the events of 
increased U.S. shale oil production (since 2007) and with the global financial crisis (GFC). 
We will add a dummy variable set to 1 for the key financial crisis months 2008:09 - 2008:11, 
and otherwise zero, in equation (1).1 In the monthly data real stock returns in September, 
October and November are an extraordinary run of -9.89%, -17.60% and -6.69%, 
respectively.  
The cumulative impulse responses of U.S. real stock return to negative one standard 
deviation structural shocks in non-U.S. and in U.S. oil production over 1973:01-2014:12 with 
a dummy variable for the GFC in equation (1) appear in Figure 2d. The presence of a dummy 
variable for the GFC reduces the distinctiveness of the effects of shocks to non-U.S. oil 
production and U.S. oil production on real stock returns. In particular, the presence of the 
GFC dummy variable mutes the anomalous result of a positive effect on real stock returns of 
a negative shock to non-U.S. oil production.  
The finding that shocks to U.S. oil production are positively associated with real stock 
returns is robust to inclusion of the  GFC dummy variable. With recognition of the GFC, a 
negative shock to U.S. oil production has negative effects on U.S. real stock returns, and the 
effects are statistically significant in the sixth month and in the fourteenth month and later. In 
a sample over 1973:01-2006:12, a positive U.S. oil supply shock only has a statistically 
significantly positive impact on U.S. real stock returns in the twenty-first and twenty-second 
months. These results underscore the importance when examining U.S. real stock returns of 
the disaggregation of world oil production into U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply components 
following the “Shale Revolution”. 
                                                            
1 The months 2008:09 - 2008:11 are associated with the GFC for the following reasons. Lehman Brothers filed 
for bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008, and the stock market declined sharply. The week of October 
6–10 was the worst week for the stock market since 1933 with the S & P's 500 index losing 18.2 percent. The 
GFC appears to have stabilized by the end of November 2008 with the U.S. Federal Reserve pledging to 
purchase mortgage bonds guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
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We compute forecast error variance decomposition to address the important question 
of how much of the variation in U.S. real stock returns is due to each structural shock in the 
crude oil market. Table 1 and Table 2 show the average contributions of each structural shock 
to the total variation in U.S. real stock returns over 1973:01-2006:12 and over 1973:01-
2014:12. It shows that by disaggregating world oil supply into U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply 
shocks, demand and supply shocks are comparable in explaining the variation in U.S. real 
stock returns. In the period 1973:01-2006:12, supply shocks explain 14.1% of the variation in 
U.S. real stock returns, while demand shocks explain 16.8% after 60 months. Over 1973:01-
2014:12, supply shocks account for 11.9% and demand shocks account for 11.6% of 
variations of U.S. real stock returns after 60 months. For a model in which oil production is 
consolidated as world oil production, supply shocks forecast 6.8% of the variation in U.S. 
real stock returns over 1973:01-2014:12. 
 
4. Effects of oil supply shocks on real stock returns across industries  
To shed light on the nature of the information contained in the U.S. oil production we 
examine whether the effects of the structural oil market shocks on real stock returns differ 
across industries. If the main channel of the U.S. oil production-stock market index 
correlation is limited to the oil production related sector, then it seems reasonable treating the 
recent U.S. oil production increase as a positive supply innovation. We report forecast error 
variance decomposition results for sector real stock returns for the four industries considered 
by Kilian and Park (2009) in Table 3.2 These industries are the petroleum and natural gas 
industry, because of possible ownership of oil resources; the automotive industry, because it 
may be sensitive to energy prices; the retail industry, because oil price has an effect on 
                                                            
2 In generating results, a U.S. sector real return replaces U.S. real stock return in equation (1). The data are at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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discretionary income; and the precious metals sector, where high oil prices might be 
associated with political uncertainty 
In Table 3, at the 60 month forecast horizon, shocks to U.S. oil production account for 
statistically significant 4.7%, 9.6%, 4.7% and 5.0% of the variation in real returns in the 
petroleum and natural gas, automobile, retail and precious metals industries, respectively. U.S. 
oil production does not mainly predict returns of the petroleum and natural gas industry, but 
contains information for retail spending, for purchases in the automotive sector, and for 
uncertainty reflected in demand for precious metals. In results not shown, impulse response 
functions indicate that the magnitude of response in the returns in the automobile (negative 
effect) and precious metals (positive effect) industries to a negative U.S. oil production shock 
are particularly large (Results are available upon request). 
Identifying world oil production by non-U.S. and U.S. components has a dramatic 
effect on the ability of oil supply shocks to forecast industry returns. Over the 60 month 
horizon, oil production shocks (U.S. and non-U.S.) forecast 9.7%, 14.5%, 10.1% and 9.1% of 
the variation in real stock returns of the petroleum and natural gas, automobile, retail and 
precious metals industries, respectively, in Table 3.  In contrast, in a model in which oil 
production is consolidated as world oil production, supply shocks forecast only 5.3%, 5.6%, 
6.0% and 3.9% of the variation in real stock returns of the petroleum and natural gas, 
automobile, retail and precious metals industries, respectively, as shown in Table 4. 
Identifying oil production shocks originating outside and inside the U.S. is particularly 
important for forecasting returns in the automobile and truck industry. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we show the importance of distinguishing between U.S. and non-U.S. oil 
supply shocks for understanding the impact of structural shocks in the oil market on U.S. real 
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stock returns. Shocks to U.S. oil production are positively associated with U.S. real stock 
returns and the link is statistically significant in the fourteenth month and later. This is a 
stronger result than that obtained by estimating the model over a sample period ending before 
the start of the production of shale oil in 2007. This highlights the importance of separating 
the influences of U.S. and non-U.S. oil production on real stock returns in recent years. In 
contrast to the results reported in Kilian and Park (2009), oil demand and supply shocks are 
of comparable importance in explaining U.S. real stock returns when supply shocks from U.S. 
and non-U.S. oil production are identified. Distinguishing between U.S. and non-U.S. oil 
supply shocks is also important to understanding the effects of oil supply shocks on industries’ 
real stock returns, especially for the automobile and truck industry. 
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Table 1. Forecast error variance decomposition of U.S. real stock market return: 1973:01-2006:12 
Horizon 
Non-U.S. oil supply 
shock 
U.S. oil supply 
shock 
Aggregate demand 
shock 
Oil-market specific demand 
shock Other shock 
1 0.000 (0.01) 0.001 (0.07) 0.005 (0.36) 0.041 (1.22) 0.954 (25.36) 
3 0.003 (0.25) 0.001 (0.06) 0.009 (0.55) 0.061 (1.63) 0.926 (21.73) 
12 0.019 (0.99) 0.028 (1.30) 0.029 (1.40) 0.074 (2.09) 0.850 (18.96) 
24 0.061 (2.63) 0.056 (2.00) 0.053 (2.42) 0.095 (2.89) 0.735 (16.22) 
60 0.067 (2.92) 0.074 (2.26) 0.065 (2.89) 0.103 (3.38) 0.692 (14.92) 
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return. The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-
statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. 
 
Table 2. Forecast error variance decomposition of U.S. real stock market return: 1973:01-2014:12 
Horizon 
Non-U.S. oil supply 
shock 
U.S. oil supply 
shock 
Aggregate demand 
shock 
Oil-market specific demand 
shock Other shock 
1 0.001 (0.09) 0.001 (0.09) 0.002 (0.24) 0.006 (0.48) 0.990 (44.90) 
3 0.006 (0.48) 0.012 (0.61) 0.005 (0.49) 0.012 (0.74) 0.966 (33.62) 
12 0.019 (1.14) 0.031 (1.25) 0.027 (1.56) 0.037 (1.79) 0.885 (23.76) 
24 0.056 (2.59) 0.042 (1.69) 0.042 (2.22) 0.063 (2.71) 0.798 (20.71) 
60 0.063 (2.86) 0.056 (2.10) 0.049 (2.54) 0.067 (2.95) 0.766 (19.16) 
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return. The values in parentheses represent the absolute t-
statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. 
 
Table 3. Forecast error variance decomposition of U.S. real stock market return by industry: 
1973:01-2014:12 
Horizon 
Non-US oil supply 
shock 
US oil supply 
 shock 
Aggregate demand 
shock 
Oil-market specific demand 
shock Other shock 
Panel 1. Petroleum and Natural Gas 
1 0.002 (0.18) 0.001 (0.05) 0.011 (0.69) 0.026 (1.23) 0.961 (31.47) 
12 0.030 (1.64) 0.022 (1.03) 0.044 (2.01) 0.060 (2.42) 0.845 (21.74) 
60 0.050 (2.57) 0.047 (1.93) 0.061 (2.77) 0.088 (3.70) 0.754 (18.94) 
Panel 2. Automobiles and Trucks  
1 0.000 (0.03) 0.003 (0.28) 0.000 (0.00) 0.031 (1.20) 0.966 (32.08) 
12 0.010 (0.73) 0.052 (1.51) 0.054 (2.47) 0.081 (2.76) 0.802 (17.40) 
60 0.049 (2.37) 0.096 (2.67) 0.069 (3.19) 0.120 (3.98) 0.666 (15.12) 
Panel 3. Retail 
1 0.000 (0.03) 0.001 (0.05) 0.000 (0.01) 0.019 (1.02) 0.980 (40.14) 
12 0.023 (1.19) 0.014 (0.81) 0.021 (1.29) 0.045 (1.95) 0.896 (25.08) 
60 0.054 (2.35) 0.047 (1.99) 0.032 (1.82) 0.069 (2.93) 0.799 (20.66) 
Panel 4. Precious Metals 
1 0.003 (0.30) 0.003 (0.18) 0.002 (0.31) 0.012 (0.80) 0.980 (38.57) 
12 0.022 (1.29) 0.036 (1.54) 0.020 (1.25) 0.039 (1.89) 0.883 (25.35) 
60 0.041 (2.10) 0.050 (2.11) 0.058 (2.59) 0.048 (2.35) 0.804 (20.25) 
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return across industries. The values in parentheses 
represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. 
 
Table 4. Forecast error variance decomposition of real U.S. stock market return across industries 
with consolidated world oil supply shock: 1973:01-2014:12 
Horizon World oil supply shock Aggregate demand shock 
Oil-market specific demand 
shock Other shock 
Panel 1. Petroleum and Natural Gas 
1 0.001 (0.08) 0.008 (0.47) 0.040 (1.55) 0.952 (29.02) 
12 0.029 (1.56) 0.037 (1.70) 0.071 (2.55) 0.863 (23.02) 
60 0.053 (2.51) 0.063 (2.63) 0.099 (3.59) 0.786 (20.24) 
Panel 2. Automobiles and Trucks 
1 0.001 (0.07) 0.001 (0.16) 0.011 (0.61) 0.987 (44.56) 
12 0.011 (0.78) 0.061 (2.41) 0.070 (2.43) 0.859 (22.89) 
60 0.056 (2.44) 0.081 (3.31) 0.110 (3.50) 0.753 (18.74) 
Panel 3. Retail 
1 0.002 (0.15) 0.000 (0.00) 0.009 (0.64) 0.989 (47.53) 
12 0.024 (1.24) 0.023 (1.31) 0.031 (1.57) 0.922 (29.15) 
60 0.060 (2.39) 0.032 (1.69) 0.061 (2.56) 0.847 (23.03) 
Panel 4. Precious Metals 
1 0.003 (0.27) 0.002 (0.17) 0.016 (0.92) 0.980 (43.49) 
12 0.021 (1.30) 0.020 (1.14) 0.036 (1.72) 0.923 (29.08) 
60 0.039 (1.98) 0.060 (2.38) 0.045 (2.08) 0.856 (21.32) 
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return across industries. The values in parentheses 
represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients' standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. 
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Figure 1. Monthly U.S. and Non-U.S. oil production, 1973:01 – 2014:12 
 Notes: Data from the U.S. Department of Energy.  
Non‐U.S. oil 
production
Total U.S. oil 
production
Shale oil 
production 
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Figure 2. Response of U.S. real stock return to negative oil production shocks 
a. Five variable model: 1973:01-2006:12 
                                              Non-U.S. oil production                                U.S. oil production  
                                                    
b. Five variable model: 1973:01-2014:12          
                                       Non-U.S. oil production                               U.S. oil production 
                                                   
c. Four variable model (Kilian and Park (2009)) 
                                      World oil production                                           World oil production 
         Sample 1973:01-2006:12                                  Sample 1973:01-2014:12     
    
d. Five variable model with GFC dummy variable: 1973:01-2014:12          
                                   Non-U.S. oil production                               U.S. oil production 
                                  Notes: Each diagram shows the cumulative impulse response of U.S. real stock return to negative one standard deviation structural shock in  non-
U.S., U.S., and world oil production.  Results for shocks in non-U.S. and U.S. oil production are obtained from estimation of the five variable 
model in equation (1) and results for shocks in world oil production are obtained from estimating the four variable model in Kilian and Park 
(2009). Point estimates are reported with one-standard error bands constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. The exogenous global 
financial crisis (GFC) dummy variable is set equal to 1 for the months 2008:09, 2008:10 and 2008:11, and 0 otherwise. 
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